T he organizing stages that predate entry into an organizational population were studied from an ecological perspective. Based on a detailed analysis of foreign banks in Shanghai, findings are presented that suggest that the likelihood of moving from the organizing phase to the operational stages is nonmonotonically dependent on the length of the waiting time. We found that firms seeking to gain entry into a population are negatively affected by the presence of other organizers in close geographical proximity, while the number of already-established organizations has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the aspirant's likelihood of entering a relationship that operates more broadly. After investigating the effect of the geographical location of other potential entrants, as well as the effect of relative sizes and countries of origin, we have drawn inferences about the strength of these competitors' identities and their impact on a social actor's decision to enter the population. Our findings are informative not only for those studying organizational founding patterns, but also for those interested in the early process of identity formation.
Introduction
The view that ecological dynamics-defined as competitive and legitimating interactions among social actors-occur not only within established organizational populations but also apply to organizers seeking to gain entry into these populations, is increasingly recognized by organization theorists (Carroll and Hannan 2000, pp. 339-356; Carroll and Khessina 2005; Ruef 2006; Sørensen and Sorenson 2003) . One of the more attractive features of this approach is the fresh perspective it brings to the analysis of organizational founding. A large majority of studies in the field of organizational ecology have treated founding attempts as single events that occur within an undefined pool of potential entrepreneurs. Unlike failure rate studies, the not yet fully established organization cannot be identified and cannot be meaningfully represented in the analysis in terms of its characteristics. By decomposing the founding rate into its component parts, i.e., the organizing attempt and subsequent entry into the population, such an analysis becomes possible (Carroll and Khessina 2005) .
The organizing attempt and subsequent entry constitute two separate events that each has received considerable empirical attention, but overall, still "very little is known about what happens in between an organizing attempt and an actual founding" (Carroll and Khessina 2005, p. 184) , in particular when it comes to the question of how the ecological processes that are active during the pre-entry phase affect the likelihood of entering an organizational population (for recent exceptions see Carroll and Hannan 2000 , Ruef 2006 , Sørensen and Sorenson 2003 . A study was thus designed to further develop and extend this line of inquiry by taking into account (1) the emerging organization's characteristics (scant research in this area has predominantly investigated environmental effects) and (2) weighted effects of social actors in the competitive environment.
To illuminate the nature of these potential effects, we applied an ecological model to predict a social actor's likelihood of moving from pre-entry activity to becoming a fully established member of a population (a likelihood that is also referred to as the "transition rate," or the rate of entry into the population of operational organizations). We found that this rate depends on the presence of other potential entrants, but also on the presence of already established organizations. Our findings are informative not only for those studying organizational founding patterns, but also for those interested in the early process of identity formation. After investigating the effect of the geographical location of other potential entrants, as well as the effect of relative sizes and countries of origin, we have drawn inferences about the strength of these competitors' identities and their impact on a social actor's decision to enter the population.
The foreign banking population in Shanghai was selected as the setting for this study. Foreign banks can be considered as a distinct organizational form in Organization Science 17(3), pp. 385-401, © 2006 INFORMS China. Foreign banks differ from native banks in several important ways. From a legislative point of view, foreign banks in China are governed by a different and more restrictive set of laws than those that regulate the actions of local banks (Fu 1998) . For instance, foreign banks have largely been excluded from providing local currency services to domestic enterprises in the private sector, and instead have mainly served multinational corporations (He and Fan 2004) . As a result of these different sets of regulations, the Chinese market is highly segregated, and direct competition between foreign and local banks has remained limited. Foreign banks also differ from local banks in terms of organizational structure, size (Wong and Wong 2001) , corporate governance, and employment practices (He and Fan 2004, Lardy 1998) . Furthermore, accounts of the Shanghai banking sector, such as those found in histories of banking in Shanghai (Ji 2003 , Tamagna 1942 as well as in contemporary media reports, invariably apply the categorization of foreign and local banks.
Foreign banks seeking entry into the Chinese market experience a mandatory pre-entry stage in the form of establishing a representative office first, before the bank can start to provide revenue-generating banking services. This provides observable events to mark the start of organizing activities and the start of actual operations. In this study, successful entry into the population was defined as a successful application for branch bank status (after which it becomes possible to generate revenue, cf. Jovanovic 2004) , rather than the initial establishment of a representative office. In what follows, the time a bank spends between these events is interpreted as waiting time before the transition (cf. Hannan et al. 2006 , Jovanovic 2004 , Schoonhoven et al. 1990 ).
Theoretical Background
This study was designed to analyze the ecological process by which social actors (that we refer to as organizers) seek entry into a broader population or community. The core features of this process are, first, that there is, in principle, a nonzero waiting time for organizers prior to their entry into a population. A waiting time, defined as the length of the organizing period, also referred to as the gestation period Freeman 1989, Rao 2001) , is used by the organizer to accumulate resources, to build up external ties with relevant actors, and to generate appeal for certain products or services (Hannan et al. 2006) . Because many of these activities seem hard to avoid prior to the commencement of operations, the assumption of a minimum waiting time seems reasonable (Hannan et al. 2006) . Empirical studies show that waiting times can be of considerable length. Ruef (2006) , for example, who analyzed the founding of medical schools in the United States between 1766 and 1930, reports an average waiting time (between the announcement of the school and operational startup) of about two years, but with individual waiting times varying between a few months and as much as 26 years. Schoonhoven et al. (1990) report waiting times for semiconductor firms (between the start of organizing activities and first product shipment) from one month up to more than four years (with a mean duration of almost two years).
A second, related feature of the typical pre-entry process is that there are a number of other organizers engaged in the process at the same time, of which only a subset can enter. Due to restrictions, possibly arising from limits on the carrying capacity of the market, only a limited number of the pool of organizers normally will be able to reach the operational stage. In their study of automobile preproducers, Carroll and Hannan (2000) showed that indeed many aspiring automobile manufacturers failed prior to commencing production: Of the 3,845 automobile preproducers that were identified as having been involved in organizing efforts between 1885 and 1981, only 11% succeeded in making the transition to production (Carroll and Hannan 2000) .
Based on the first core feature of this pre-entry process, which is in essence a type of Darwinian variation with selective retention model on the pre-entry level, theoretical arguments will be presented relating the length of the waiting time to the likelihood of becoming a fully established organization. Based on the second feature, specific hypotheses will be developed concerning the interaction with other organizers during pre-entry activity and how these interactions influence the likelihood of entry into the population.
With very few exceptions, most of the growing number of foreign banks in Shanghai went through the process described above, thereby qualifying this population as an excellent opportunity to study pre-entry activity (cf. Carroll and Hannan 2000, p. 345) . Local banking regulations stipulate that, in principle, foreign banks wishing to enter the Chinese market need to start their operations in China as so-called representative offices. Such offices were considered for the purposes of this study to be the equivalent of organizers. Such representative offices are generally small in terms of office space and number of employees (often not more than five), and they require a relatively small amount of investment by the parent bank. Representative offices are sanctioned to engage in consulting, liaison, market research, and other nonprofit activities. As their name suggests, they represent their parent bank abroad.
After having operated a representative office in China for some time, a foreign bank may decide to apply for full branch status offering trade services. Local regulators may then issue a license if the bank meets certain requirements. The two most important of these minimum requirements are:
-That the bank must have had total assets of no less than US$20 billion with a capital-adequacy ratio of no less than 8% at the end of the year before the application was made.
-That the bank must have maintained a representative office in China for at least two years.
1
The intent of this two-tier (representative office-branch office) system, from the perspective of local regulators, is twofold. On the one hand, it ensures that only committed and financially healthy foreign banks are allowed to actually provide financial services in the Chinese market. On the other hand, it protects the local banking sector from too much competition from foreign banks. By gradually allowing foreign banks to integrate into China's financial market, local regulators hope to promote financial reform of the domestic banking sector (Lees and Liaw 1996) .
From a foreign bank's perspective, despite the fact that it requires a substantial increase in commitment and investment (Chang 1995, Johanson and Vahlne 1977) , there is a clear incentive to become a member of the population of foreign banks allowed to operate branches. Branch offices are allowed to offer a wide range of banking services-accepting deposits, making loans, extending trade services, and in some cases, underwriting securities offerings-hence, the branch offices are allowed to generate profits. This explains why firms are willing to operate unprofitable representative offices for periods that can sometimes be protracted. From an analytical angle, the transition from a representative office to a branch thus matters substantially, because the shift in the mode of operation also means that the foreign bank becomes subject to a whole new set of market forces, such as price competition. A foreign bank that obtains a branch license also has to start tapping into broader parts of the labor market, as differently skilled employees have to be hired.
Hypotheses Duration Dependence
How does the likelihood that an organizer achieves organizational start-up vary over the length of the organizing period? Studies on the "liability of newness" (a term coined by Stinchcombe 1965) suggest that organizers face some typical problems associated with new venture formation (such as difficulties establishing ties with relevant external actors or problems in learning new roles for those within the emerging organization), but that they will increasingly be able to overcome these difficulties as time passes. Numerous empirical studies show that as organizers proceed through the organizing period, their survival chances increase and bottlenecks are broken (see Aldrich 1999 or Carroll and Hannan 2000, p. 288) . As an organizer gradually overcomes these problems, the liability of newness erodes, and the likelihood of successful entry increases.
2 Ruef's (2006) study of initial organizing among medical schools indeed found that the probability of entry was substantially higher later in the organizing period (over two years) compared to the early stages (less than two years).
There is, however, counterevidence to Ruef's (2006) finding of positive duration dependence. Rao (2001) , in his study of the early automobile industry between 1893 and 1912, finds a pattern of negative duration dependence. Here, a long waiting time actually reduced the success of the entry attempt: The longer the potential automobile manufacturer spends in the preoperational phase, the slimmer its chances of reaching the operational stage. Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 122) provide an argument for why this might be the case. They point out that the likelihood of entry may decline as a result of limited foresight in the design of organizational structures and strategies. These issues are often decided upon at the beginning of the organizing period with the aim of being well aligned with the environment at the time of the actual founding event. However, which organizational structure and strategy will be most effective at that time becomes more difficult to predict as the length of the organizing period increases. As a result, the probability of a successful transition from organizing activities to the operational stage might decline as the organizing period becomes too lengthy.
Studies that have examined the pattern of duration dependence more extensively have found a combination of the patterns described above Hannan 2000, Schoonhoven et al. 1990 ). These studies have consistently found that the likelihood of entry first rises, but then drops at later stages in the organizing period. Carroll and Hannan (2000) , for instance, report a clear peak in the pattern of duration dependence after approximately six years. Schoonhoven et al. (1990) , in a study of semiconductor firms between 1978 and 1985, found a similar inverted U-shaped effect of the waiting time, but here the peak occurred after two and a half years.
These arguments lead us to expect (as a baseline) an inverted U-shaped relationship between the length of the waiting time and the likelihood of entry into the organizational population. 
Ecological Dynamics
Aside from the length of the organizing period, factors stemming from the competitive environment also appear to be of considerable importance in influencing entry into a population. During the organizing period, two types of competitors are likely to influence the likelihood of entry: other organizers and already established, operating organizations.
In predicting the effect of the presence of the number of operational organizations, we follow the logic of density dependence theory (Hannan and Carroll 1992) .
Organization Science 17(3), pp. 385-401, © 2006 INFORMS According to this theory, two important processes influence new organizational foundings: 3 competition and (constitutive) legitimation. When a particular organizational form is perceived as legitimate, in the sense that it is seen as a taken-for-granted aspect of the institutional environment (Meyer and Scott 1992) , this greatly facilitates founding an organization pertaining to that form (Hannan and Carroll 1992) . Legitimation has its strongest effect on organizational founding when the number of organizations is low. Competition, in contrast, is more dominant when the number of operational organizations in the market is high and has exceeded a threshold (Hannan and Carroll 1992) . Competition in such cases deters entry because it signals a scarcity of resources, and decreased opportunities, to potential founders.
Similarly, in a pre-entry context, it is likely that organizers are positively influenced to attempt entry by initial increases in the number of fully established organizations. The fact that some organizers have made the transition to an operating organization has a contagious, legitimating effect on other organizers and, based on this feedback, they are more likely to make the transition as well (Greve 1995, Lee and Pennings 2002) . If, however, too many organizers decide to enter a population (i.e., the number of operating organizations exceeds a threshold), then the probability of organizers attempting to achieve operational start-up will decline. With the prospect of intense competition, an increased proportion of organizers will refrain from following their peers into the operational stage. Hence, it is expected that the impact of the number of operational organizations on the likelihood of entry will show an inverted U-shaped pattern.
While density dependence theories have received widespread support in firm-founding studies (for an overview, see Carroll and Hannan 2000) , previous studies on pre-entry ecological dynamics so far show mixed evidence for and against this parallel prediction. Schoonhoven et al. (1990) found that higher numbers of established organizations actually shortened waiting times before entry into a market. Ruef (2006) also found positive effects of the number of operational organizations on the likelihood of entry. In contrast, Carroll and Hannan (2000) found only a negative (and second-order) effect of automobile producer density, similar to the findings of Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) who, based on a study of organizing activities in television broadcasting between 1965 and 1987, also found strong negative effects of the presence of organizations that had already made the transition. In fact, as Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) show in their analysis, potential founders frequently underestimate these effects when they evaluate opportunities and start their initial organizing efforts.
Only Rao (2001) , in his study of founding attempts in the early stages of the automobile industry, was able to detect a nonmonotonic, inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of operational organizations. He found that the number of existing automobile manufacturers had a nonlinear relationship with both the likelihood that an organizer became incorporated as well as with the initiation of automobile manufacturing with the purpose of selling them.
Despite this somewhat inconclusive evidence, we posit:
Hypothesis 2A. The number of organizations in a population has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the organizer's rate of entry into that population.
It is expected that a similar inverted U-shaped pattern would hold for the effect of the number of organizers that simultaneously try to establish operational organizations. With initial increases in the number of peers, being a candidate to enter a particular population would be legitimized. This should lead external constituents to make more resources available, increasing the likelihood that an organizer will be able to establish a fully operational organization. When organizers become too numerous, however, the effect of other organizers on the likelihood of entry is instead likely to be dominated by competition. As the number of organizers increases, more of the resources that are needed to establish an operating organization will already be claimed by others. This increase in diffuse competition (Hannan and Carroll 1992) causes supplies of suitable locations, employees, potential customers, and other resources to become exhausted. As the number of organizers increases, it will therefore become increasingly difficult to move from the preoperational stage to the operational stage.
The only study that has investigated the effect of other organizers is that of Carroll and Hannan (2000) . In their study of automobile preproducers, they argued that the transition from potential to operating automobile producer depended to a large extent on the presence of other preproducers who were engaged in initial organizing, and that this effect had an inverted U-shaped pattern. As the number of other organizers increased, the likelihood of achieving operational start-up increased initially, but with a higher number of organizers this likelihood was negatively affected.
Hypothesis 2B. The number of organizers seeking to gain entry into a population has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the rate of entry into that population.

Proximity
Ecological interactions between both organizers and operational organizations are likely to have a clear spatial component. Competition, for instance, is particularly strong when organizations are located in close geographical proximity. Organizations located in close proximity are more likely to serve the same set of customers, and more likely to draw on the same set of suppliers and labor. As the distance between organizations decreases, competition between these organizations will generally tend to increase. Legitimation has similar spatial characteristics as it appears to be stronger on smaller geographical scales as well. Organizations located close by might be more visible, and thus have greater impact on opportunity perceptions and entry decisions. Organizations located in close proximity also provide a potential entrant with more opportunities to acquire knowledge and resources through local networks (Sorenson and Audia 2000) . Therefore, as the distance between a potential entrant and a set of organizations decreases, the likelihood of founding an organization of that type will increase.
Not surprisingly, spatial proximity has frequently appeared to matter in testing density dependence (e.g., Baum and Mezias 1992 , Carroll and Wade 1991 , Greve 2002 , Lomi 1995 . Whereas nonmonotonic patterns have been found on a variety of scales, these patterns often appear to be stronger within closely bounded areas. Greve (2002) , for instance, who studied entries in the Tokyo banking industry between 1894 and 1936, found strong nonmonotonic effects of density in specific areas (wards and counties) within the Tokyo prefecture, signaling both processes of legitimation and competition. These processes were weaker, however, for more distant areas. When the effects of density were estimated for neighboring areas, the same nonmonotonic pattern showed up, but both its first-and second-order effect (reflecting legitimation and competition) appeared to be substantially lower in magnitude.
Similarly, in a pre-entry context, the effects proposed in Hypotheses 2A and 2B might be expected to be stronger when measured on a more limited geographical scale.
Hypothesis 3A. The organizer's rate of entry into a population will have a stronger relationship with the number of operational organizations in the same geographical area compared to those in other areas.
Hypothesis 3B. The organizer's rate of entry into a population will have a stronger relationship with the number of other organizers in the same geographical area compared to those in other areas.
Our predictions regarding the relationship between density and geographical distance are remotely related to two other perspectives that have emerged in the ecological literature. First, it has been shown that the legitimation process has a tendency to operate more widely than competition (Bigelow et al. 1997 , Delacroix 2004 , Han 1998 , Hannan et al. 1996 , Lomi 2000 . According to this multilevel specification of density dependence, legitimation (in the form of cultural images or ideas) can more easily transcend national and regional boundaries than competition effects, and thus operates on a broader geographical scale. Our study differs in this sense, because it is focused on various subpopulations that evolve in a homogeneous regulatory and cultural context (cf Greve 2002) , in which it can be assumed that competition and legitimation have a similar scope. A second perspective draws attention to identity effects associated with collocation in particular geographical areas (McKendrick et al. 2003, Romanelli and . McKendrick et al. (2003) , for instance, find that collocation of firms in an area with a related regional identity gives the activities of these firms greater perceptual focus, stimulating the overall entry of organizations engaged in this particular activity. Our predictions do not consider the fact that areas differ in terms of their industrial identity, but are consistent with this perspective's insight that collocation in one area may stimulate the emergence of a new organizational (sub-)form across areas.
Mimetic Entry
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the likelihood that organizers enter a population depends on the total number of organizations in their environment regardless of the features of those organizations. Cognitive approaches to strategy (e.g., Greve 1995 , Porac and Thomas 1990 , Weick 1979 , however, point out that social actors label and make sense of their environment by forming cognitive categories, and that these actors will be more likely to respond to the actions and feedback of those in the same category as themselves. Organizations that are in an organizer's reference group should therefore be more likely to affect the likelihood that the organizer enters the population than those that are outside that reference group.
Building on this principle, a well-established finding in organization theory is that interactions among organizations tend to be localized on a size dimension, i.e., organizations tend to interact most intensely with those organizations that are similar in size (e.g., BanaszakHoll 1991, Baum and Mezias 1992 , Han 1998 , Hannan et al. 1990 , Lee and Pennings 2002 , Ranger-Moore et al. 1995 . It has also been suggested that similarity in size can induce mimetic behavior, as organizations are more susceptible to market feedback about those organizations in their size class (Haveman 1993a, Lee and Pennings 2002) . For instance, Lee and Pennings (2002) found strong mimetic patterns among similar-sized organizations in their study of the adoption of a new form of organization in the Dutch accounting industry between 1925 and 1990. They found that the percentage of organizations that had adopted the new organizational form stimulated subsequent adoptions among similarsized organizations. These mimetic patterns not only apply to incumbent organizations in a population, but can also explain a potential entrant's likelihood of entering (Haveman 1993a ). Haveman (1993a) has argued that operational organizations in a market that are similar in size to a potential entrant will more strongly legitimate that market than those that are less similar. The presence of similar-sized organizations signals the feasibility of organizations of that size competing in the market, encouraging the entry of organizations in that size class.
However, when too many organizations of similar size are operating in a market, competition will tend to decrease the likelihood that new organizations in that size class will seek to enter (Haveman 1993a) . Organizations of similar size are likely to have similar strategies and structures, and as a consequence to draw on similar sets of resources (Carroll and Hannan 2000) . Competition among many similar-sized organizations may therefore be particularly intense, and so too will be its detrimental effects (Banaszak-Holl 1991 , Baum and Mezias 1992 , Han 1998 , Hannan et al. 1990 , Ranger-Moore et al. 1995 . In a pre-entry context, if too many organizations of a similar size move from an organizing phase into the operational phase, other organizers from that same size class may refrain from following.
Combining these arguments, it is expected that the organizers' likelihood of entry will first increase and then decrease with the number of similar-sized organizations.
Hypothesis 4. The number of similar-sized organizations already in operation will have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the organizer's rate of entry.
Aside from size as a determinant of the relevant reference group, the country of origin might be another dimension along which competitive and mimetic effects are localized. McKendrick et al. (2003) and Romanelli and Khessina (2005) explore the idea that the collocation of organizations in the same geographical area is tied to social identities. Romanelli and Khessina (2005) develop the notion of regional industrial identities to refer to the socially constructed identity of regions tied to the prevalence of particular industries. McKendrick et al. (2003) find that the formation of a common social identity of an organizational population is facilitated when organizations agglomerate in places with a related regional identity. Furthermore, organizations that originate from the same region may view each other as being part of the same cognitive category. When these organizations move abroad they will be perceptually focused on their peers from the same home region, peers that are part of the same community of foreign investors (cf. Guillén 2002, Li et al. forthcoming, Yiu and Makino 2002) . Following Li et al. (forthcoming) , mimetic effects will therefore be strongest within a community of foreign firms with similar regional identities in a host market. In this host market, organizations will follow the lead of those with similar regional identities, for instance, when moving into the operational phase. Again, however, this happens only up to a certain extent (Haveman 1993a ): If too many organizations from a particular home region move from organizing into operation, other organizers from that same home region may refrain from following. The resource space for organizations from a particular region will become saturated, making it less attractive for organizers originating from that same region to move into that space.
Hypothesis 5. The number of operational organizations from the same home region will have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the organizer's rate of entry.
Data and Methods Empirical Context and Data Sources
To test the hypotheses, data were collected on all foreign banks in Shanghai over the period . Shanghai was selected as the geographic focus of this study because Shanghai has been receiving the lion's share of China's foreign direct investment (FDI) and has been accounting for a large proportion of China's exports since its open-door policy came into effect in the early 1980s. As more and more foreign businesses have chosen to locate there, Shanghai has accumulated a body of customers in need of financial services. Additionally, more bank branches have been opened in this city than in any other city in China (PBOC 2005) , and foreign banks have, after obtaining a branch license became possible in this city in 1990, generally opened a branch in this city first before they opened branches in other cities.
The main sources of data were the annual editions of The Bankers' Almanac, which contain address listings of bank offices worldwide. The Bankers' Almanac also shows the mode of operation of each bank office (i.e., representative office or foreign branch). Comparing the different editions yields the year of entry (and exit) of a foreign bank, as well as the year in which any change from representative office to branch office took place. The data were cross-checked against and validated by the banks' annual reports and information in the Quarterly Statistical Bulletin of China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC 2005) . This publication lists all foreign banks that have received a license to operate a branch office, including the exact date on which this event took place. The final data set contained 577 bank-year observations, covering 117 individual banks "at risk" of transition, of which 41 banks (or 35%) made the transition to branch office before the end of the observation window. Figure 1 depicts the historical trajectory of both representative offices and bank branches in Shanghai. As this figure shows, the number of both representative offices and foreign branches in Shanghai grew rapidly for 20 years from the early 1980s. In December 1982, the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Bank of Tokyo were among the first to establish representative offices 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 in Shanghai. By the end of 1988, the total number of foreign banks in Shanghai had already reached 32. The rise in the number of representative offices in Shanghai, however, came to a standstill in 1990 and even decreased in 1991. This decrease may be attributed to two causes. First, limitations on entering China's financial markets became visible after the Tiananmen Square uprising in June 1989. Foreign banks, for their part, adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the Chinese market, and new developments progressed with great caution (MacCormac 1993). As a result, the earlier boom in new representative offices came to a halt. Second, in the early 1990s it first became possible for foreign banks in Shanghai to upgrade their operations to the status of branch office. In other words, the decrease in the number of representative offices in this period is partly complementary to the increase in the number of branches. At first, the granting of licenses was rather experimental. Banks were chosen based on a mixture of economic, political, and historical motives. 4 These banks were given branch permissions as early as 1990 and 1991 (for which we will control in our analysis). Soon, however, the process of applying for licenses became more formalized and mechanistic, so that, in principle, every foreign bank meeting the requirements was eligible to apply and equally likely to receive a branch license. It took banks, on average, four and a half years to establish a branch, with variations from about 1 year up to 13 years. This figure excludes right-censored cases n = 40 and banks that ended throughout the observation window without achieving branch status 5 n = 36 . Despite the relatively long waiting times (compared to those reported by Carroll and Hannan 2000 , Ruef 2006 , and Schoonhoven et al. 1990 ), the number of candidates for a branch license (i.e., representative offices) as well as the number of branch licensees continued to increase in the mid-1990s, mainly due to an improved economic climate in terms of rapid growth in gross domestic product, a thriving real estate market, and a more attractive capital market. A wave of mergers and acquisitions, most notable among Japanese financial institutions, was among the main factors that caused a drop in the number of branch licensees during the last years of our observation window.
Statistical Methodology
To gain insight into the shift from representative office to branch office, event history analysis (e.g., Allison 1984 , Yamaguchi 1991 ) was applied, with the issuing of the branch license as the event. The transition rate from representative office to branch office, r t , was formally defined as the probability that a foreign bank, i, opens a branch office in Shanghai at (or shortly after) time t, given that it has maintained a representative office in the city up to time t.
office in Shanghai t
Because we are interested in how this transition rate depends on the waiting time, it was imperative that no functional form for this transition rate be chosen in advance. Therefore, we relied on piecewise exponential specifications that have the characteristic that the transition rate can vary between predefined period segments, but remains constant within each segment. In this way, no strong assumptions were made about the shape of the transition rate, which in principle could be anything. The piecewise exponential model has the general form
where r i t is the transition rate; x it is a vector of coefficients and covariates x ; and is a constant that is allowed to vary between preselected periods p. After experimenting with several alternatives, the following division appeared to produce the sharpest results: 0 2 , 2 4 , 4 7 , 7 11 , and periods longer than 11 years. The piecewise exponential specification was implemented by adding a user-defined routine (stpiece) to the statistical package STATA (Sørensen 1999) .
To compare nested models we use a test statistic based on the work of Haberman (1977) , which parallels the likelihood-ratio test of a restricted model specification S 2 against a less restricted specification S 1 . Haberman (1977) shows that the analogy holds even if the event count is small.
This statistic has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of restrictions (i.e., variables) between S 1 and S 2 . A derivative of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC') was used to compare nonnested models. The BIC' value (Raftery 1995) uses as a baseline the null model and takes into account the log likelihood ln L , the degrees of freedom k , and the sample size n , which in this case can be interpreted as the number of events (Raftery 1995, p. 137) . The BIC' value is equal to −2 ln L + k ln n where, in principle, the model with the lowest BIC' value is preferred.
Variables and Measures
To model the transition from representative office to foreign branch, a number of variables are introduced. A first set of variables were density measures. Density was a time-varying covariate specified for both representative offices and branch offices, and on the city level and the district level. The city of Shanghai is divided into several administrative districts, of which (after investigating the address information in The Bankers' Almanac) nine were found to host foreign banks. 6 The effect of the presence of other representative offices and foreign branches in the same district as well as in other districts on the rate of transition to branch office was tested. Similarly, to test Hypothesis 5, the effect of the density of bank branches from the same home region, as well as from other regions, was evaluated. We first tried the more restricted version of these measures-density from the same home country versus different home countries-but these did not appear to work well: Because many foreign banks were the only representative of their home country there were many zero counts (or close to zero). To solve this, we instead focused on home regions Home region was defined in terms of the following areas: Japan, Middle East, the rest of Asia, Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Australia. In each of these analyses, the density measure was a simple count of offices or branches. All density measures were lagged one year in the modeling. Some density tests were accompanied by a second-order term to capture any nonmonotonic patterns, but when modeling these density effects we avoided testing them concurrently with other sets of quadratic terms to avoid multicollinearity (cf. Hannan et al. 1995 , McKendrick et al. 2003 , Sørensen and Sorenson 2003 , Sorenson and Audia 2000 .
A measure of size effects was constructed based on the nearness between the size of an organizer and the sizes of the organizations already operating. This nearness variable showed a high value for a particular representative office if its parent bank was similar in size to the banks already maintaining a branch office anywhere in Shanghai. (For details on this measure of size localization, see the appendix.) Size, which was also included separately to capture the parent bank's capacity to provide its affiliate in Shanghai with the necessary funds, was approximated by the parent bank's total assets. The size of the parent organization was used rather than the size of the affiliate in Shanghai, as (particularly in this stage of the development of the financial sector in Shanghai) the foreign affiliates were far from selfsufficient. It is easy to imagine that larger banks might experience lower political and economic entry barriers and will find it easier to upgrade their offices to branch status (cf. Haveman 1993b, Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000) . The logarithm of total assets was used to normalize its distribution. In addition, as banks gain more international experience, their ability to cope with diverse and complex environments is likely to improve. Consequently, they might become better at dealing with the specific local regulations and procedures that in this case govern the transition from representative to branch office. For this reason, the extent of multinationality is included and can be defined as the total number of foreign countries in which the organization has an investment (Youssef 1975) .
To control for possible spatial heterogeneity across districts in Shanghai, the methods of Greve (2000 Greve ( , 2002 were applied by including a dummy variable reflecting the centrality of the district. The distinction between urban districts, the suburban district Pudong, and the central districts (the latter being the benchmark in the models) appeared to capture much of this heterogeneity while remaining parsimonious in adding degrees of freedom.
To control for possible temporal heterogeneity in the transition rate, a variable was created describing the timing of initial entry into Shanghai, 7 where initial entry refers to the setting up of a representative office. This variable was coded from 0 for foreign banks that established a representative office in Shanghai in 1982, up to 22 for banks that first established a representative office in 2004. To capture additional temporal variations in the transition rate, the three-month Eurodollar interest rate was included. It might be expected that higher interest rates would make it more attractive to establish a branch office. Both types of variables have earlier been used by Leung et al. (2003) in a study of the profitability of foreign banks in Shanghai.
On the local market level, three variables were used. The first was the annual figure for the total value of trade of the foreign bank's home country with China. The data were taken from various editions of the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook of the International Monetary Fund. Although no exact information was available on the customer bases of the parent firms, it was assumed that in moving into China banks were responding, at least in part, to the needs of their existing customers, in particular those from their home country (cf. Martin et al. 1995 , Martin et al. 1998 , and that these activities would also influence the bank in establishing a full branch. Including this measure of trade also served as a crude approximation of the market's carrying capacity (Hannan and Carroll 1992) , which should be relevant to density dependence.
Because Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) found a statistically significant negative effect of the number of transitions in the previous year (in contrast to the findings of Hannan 2000 or Ruef 2006 , who tried similar measures), a variable was added to represent this as well.
A dummy variable was created to account for the foreign banks that had obtained licenses in 1990 and 1991. These were the first two years in which obtaining a branch license was possible. As pointed out earlier, in this initial phase the procedure for granting such licenses was less formal.
Several alterations had to be made to the initial data set (which included all foreign banks in Shanghai) to account for the branch license conditions imposed by local regulators. A first condition was that a bank had to have maintained a representative office in China for two years before it could upgrade to a branch office (three years prior to 1994). For many banks that had started in Shanghai, this meant that the bank was not eligible to make the transition in its first years, when the bank was still in its probationary period. Because event history analysis explicitly models the time at risk (Allison 1984 , Yamaguchi 1991 , for these banks these first two or three years were removed from the data set.
8 A second adjustment that was made to the data set concerned the capital requirements. According to the local regulations, foreign banks needed to be capitalized with at least USD 20 billion to obtain a branch license, and have a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8%. Those banks that failed to meet these requirements were also removed from the set of banks at risk. Finally, only observations in or later than 1990 were taken into account, as in this year obtaining a branch license became possible.
9
All variables are summarized in Table 1 . Table 2 presents the results of the piecewise exponential models. The estimate of the transition rate appeared to differ strongly depending on the period segment. Based on the best-fitting model (Model 9), the transition rate appeared to be low early in the organizing period, but increasing at a decreasing rate with the length of the organizing period. After having reached a maximum between Years 7 and 11, the transition rate starts to decline. The piecewise exponential model thus showed that the duration dependence is indeed nonmonotonic and inversely U-shaped, in line with the findings of previous research Hannan 2000, Schoonhoven et al. 1990 ) and with Hypothesis 1. Table 2 also reports the influence of the model's covariates on the transition rate. In line with Hypothesis 2A, the size of the branch office population appears to have been strongly related to an individual bank's decision to upgrade to a branch office. Furthermore, the relationship was, as predicted, inverse U-shaped, as shown by the positive first-order effect and the negative second-order effect. Below a particular threshold (N * = 22, falling well within the observed range), the number of branch offices induced other foreign banks to start a branch office as well; beyond that threshold, the transition rate declined. In contrast with the prediction of Hypothesis 2B, no nonmonotonic density dependent effects are evident for the number of representative offices at the city level (Model 3). A model that tested for a linear effect of the number of representative offices at the city level (not reported here) also did not display density dependence. The decision to upgrade to a branch office was seemingly unrelated to the total number of representative offices in Shanghai.
Results
In order to test Hypothesis 3A, density was also measured at the district level (Models 4 to 7). Again, an inverted U-shaped relationship was found between the number of branches and the transition rate. The size of the first-order relationship with branch density was found to be somewhat less strong on the district level than on the city level. In contrast, the secondorder relationship with branch density was somewhat stronger. A comparison between the coefficients related to within-district density and the density outside the district (i.e., city-level density minus district-level density) yields no statistically significant difference in a Wald test (first-order coefficients: 2 = 0 33, secondorder coefficients: 2 = 0 66). The district-level specification (Model 4) also shows poorer fit than the citylevel specification (Model 2). Therefore, with respect to branch offices, there was no support for the expectation that a stronger association would be found at smaller geographical scales.
Hypothesis 3B was better supported. In contrast with what was found at the city level, representative office density at the district level showed a statistically significant relationship with the transition rate. The influence of the number of representative offices at the district was, however, linear (in contrast with expectations): One additional representative office in the same district predicted a reduction in the likelihood of transitioning to the operational stage by at least 7% exp −0 074 = 0 929 . Representative offices thus were seemingly more strongly influenced in their decision to apply for a branch license by the number of other representative offices already in their district than by offices elsewhere in the city. A Wald test of the equality of coefficients between the density of representative offices within the district and the density outside the district (based on the coefficients in Model 7) confirmed a statistically 
Densities ( significant difference (at the 1% level) with a 2 value of 10.13. Carroll and Hannan (2000) have earlier argued that organizers are particularly sensitive to other organizers during the pre-entry stages. Our results prompt a refinement of this idea, suggesting that it is especially the organizers in nearby locations that matter. The results also appear to be remotely related to the predictions of Hannan et al. (1995) that the competition effects (here associated with the presence of representative offices) operate at a smaller scale than legitimacy effects (which here are associated with branch offices).
The intuition that the identity of representative offices is particularly strong at the district level, while the identity of branch offices remains strong at the city level, was further explored in Model 8. This model included the density of branch offices citywide and the density of representative offices in each district, and this model did indeed improve significantly on the other models (e.g., Model 8 versus 2: Haberman's 2 = 7 16, d.f. = 1, p < 0 01). This suggests that the actions of a particular representative office were visible to other representative offices in close geographical proximity but were less clearly perceived in other parts of the city. When representative offices in other parts of the city upgraded their operations to the status of branch office, however, they did become more visible, and then exerted a stronger influence on other banks' decisions to convert to branch offices as well.
Relative size also appeared to play an important role in delineating the strength of the identity of other organizations in the market, providing support for Hypothesis 4. Nearness, which was designed to reflect differences in size between an organizer and the fully established organizations, showed a statistically significant nonmonotonic relationship. With initial increases in the proportion of similar-sized organizations, the transition rate increased as well, but when organizations of similar size became too numerous, the transition rate declined. Including nearness in Model 9 also led to an (albeit small) improvement in fit over Model 8.
Hypothesis 5, in which we predicted that the number of operational organizations from the same home region has an inverted U-shaped effect on the transition rate, receives general support. In addition to banks from the same home region, another variable represented banks from other regions. The effect appeared to be economically significant (an additional bank from another region implied a reduction in the estimated transition rate of more than 5%), but this relationship was statistically significant only at a 0.10 level with a twotailed test. Although we did not specify a hypothesis for this competitive effect of nonhome region density, separating banks from the same versus different home regions revealed the perceptually focused identity of home region banks. It should be noted, however, that Model 10, in which region-of-origin effects were tested, did not seem to substantially improve the fit achieved with Model 8.
In sum, we find strong support for our prediction that the transition rate has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the length of the organizing period (Hypothesis 1), has a nonmonotonic association with the total number of operational organizations (Hypothesis 2A), and is seemingly only affected by the number of aspirants in close proximity (Hypothesis 3B). The coefficient estimates of our models support mimetic entry based on relative size (Hypothesis 4) and region of origin (Hypothesis 5). With respect to the control variables, the likelihood that an individual bank upgraded to a branch office was seemingly positively affected by a location in the Pudong district of Shanghai and by exploiting the preferential policy of the years 1990 and 1991. Banks that had a high degree of multinationality were also more likely to move into the operational phase.
Discussion
The early stages of firm activity that predate its entry into a population have received only scant attention in previous organizational ecology research. This study investigated how successful entry is related to both the duration of the organizing period as well as on social actors in the entering organization's environment. Several hypotheses related to these issues were tested using data on a population of new affiliates of international banks in Shanghai. The findings show, first of all, that the transition from the organizing period to entry into the population was nonmonotonically dependent on the duration of the organizing period, a finding that is in line with results of earlier studies by Carroll and Hannan (2000) and Schoonhoven et al. (1990) . This result suggests that organizers need time to assess the market, to set up operations, and to learn about opportunities. However, it also became clear that at later stages in the organizing period the chances of moving to the operational phase become slimmer as time passes. This may well be the result of limited foresight in the design of organizational structures and strategies, as suggested by Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 122) .
In addition to investigating how the likelihood of moving from pre-entry activity to entry was related to duration, how this process was influenced by social interactions was investigated in greater depth than in previous studies. Those effects were weighted by location and size, as well as by country of origin. In terms of location, organizers appeared to be affected only by the actions of their peers within closely bounded areas, and they were seemingly unaffected by organizers located outside those areas. In developing an interpretation for this finding, we draw attention to another stream in ecological research, namely, that studying organizational identity (Hannan et al. 2006 , Hsu and Hannan 2005 , McKendrick et al. 2003 , Pólos et al. 2002 , Ruef 2000 . The results showing that the influence of organizers differs from that of operational organizations suggests that any organizer starts with a spatially limited identity (although it is not necessarily weak, because many other organizers located in close geographical proximity will recognize that organizer, as will others in the organizer's local network). The actions of the organizers at this stage are strongly influenced, however, by the identities of the organizations already in operation. Geographical distance plays a lesser role here: The actions of the organizer are also influenced by the still-sharp identities of already established organizations in more distant areas. This also implies that once an organization becomes fully established, its identity is likely to broaden geographically and is likely to influence a broader audience. One possible explanation could be that the organizer, once it has entered, starts to adopt more features of the form's identity (Pólos et al. 2002 , Hannan et al. 2006 , features it shares with other members of the form.
This study also found that operational organizations differ in the extent to which they exert an influence on individual organizers. Organizations that resemble the organizer are especially likely to influence the organizer in making the transition to a fully established organization (cf. Helfat and Lieberman 2002) . Evidence was found for size-localized legitimation and competition, indicating that organizers are particularly sensitive to the identities of similarly sized organizations, which they are likely to consider part of the same cognitive category. A similar pattern was found for banks that originated from the same home region. The number of organizations with a similar regional identity appeared to be nonmonotonically related to the organizer's chances of moving into the operational stages, while the organizer's chances were negatively associated with the number of organizations from other home regions.
One potential limitation of this study is the highly regulated nature of the pre-entry process, which may have been driven by political motives instead of the characteristics of the foreign banks. This might especially have been the case in the early 1990s, for which we tried to control in our statistical models. In general, however, we think the limitations of studying a strong regulatory environment are outweighed by its benefits. Although, as Sørensen and Sorenson (2003) indicate, regulation creates a disadvantage in terms of one's ability to draw strong inferences, it does provide a rare insight into the pre-entry phase, because the sequential stages are so clearly marked with objectively recorded data. As this study shows, regulations can provide an exceptional natural experiment in delimiting a time period of potential entry and a transition phase from one clearly defined pre-entry organizational form to another more developed organizational form.
Another limitation might be a potential lack of generalizability of the results of this study. Some would argue that the context presented here is too atypical of other countries in terms of the level of government control, the culture, and the social dynamics. Although these issues have certainly affected the findings to some extent, we think that the overall patterns found are not necessarily context specific. Take again our results concerning the duration dependence of the transition rate (which we found to follow an inverted U-shaped pattern). As noted, this particular pattern has earlier also been found in a study of U.S. automobile producers (Carroll and Hannan 2000) and in a study of semiconductor firms (Schoonhoven et al. 1990) . In these studies, however, the peak in the duration-dependent transition rate came after six years and two and a half years, respectively. In the context presented here the peak came between 7 and 11 years. Despite the differences in the location of the peak (which can be explained by context-specific factors), the inverted U pattern was nevertheless found in highly diverse regions and industries. Where else it holds, of course, remains an issue to be examined in future research.
A final limitation might be that this study focused on de alio organizers exclusively, as opposed to the mostly de novo entrepreneurs that have been studied elsewhere. Although with respect to pre-entry activities, de alio and de novo organizers are likely to differ in terms of resources and capabilities (Carroll et al. 1996, Helfat and Lieberman 2002) , we think that the same underlying pre-entry process applies to both types. This process is characterized by waiting times and a selection process that operates throughout this waiting time. A potential problem with research on pre-entry activities of de alio organizations are the difficulties associated with observing organizing periods: Carroll and Hannan's (2000) automobile study did not allow for the measurement of the preproduction efforts of de alio, established firms. As they note (p. 349), "new enterprises more likely get noticed when they undertake visible preproduction. Established firms in other industries can likely conceal their automobile preproduction efforts." This problem did not plague the study presented here due to the unique nature of the data used.
Future research should attempt to incorporate the effects of other audiences that might influence organizers to move from pre-entry to full membership of a population (Philips and Zuckerman 2001, Zuckerman 1999) . Such audiences may include the already validated members of the population (here, bank branches), investors, employees, potential customers, regulators, and industry analysts (Hsu and Hannan 2005, Hannan et al. 2006) . In this particular context, regulators were probably the most relevant audience, but employees (involved in the factual resource allocation needed for the status upgrade) and potential customers may also have been important. For instance, if multinational companies allocated their attention and resources to particular representative offices, those representative offices would have been more likely to apply for a branch license with local regulators. The allocation of attention and resources by potential customers in the candidacy phase should signal that there is a reasonable prospect of sufficient customers once the bank has become a member in the population of bank branches. On the other hand, the bank will probably wait and postpone the transition to branch office status if there is no reasonable prospect of receiving business in the future. An ecological model to predict the likelihood of moving from pre-entry activity to entry, as developed here, may serve as a basis for incorporating measures for various audiences. Such an effort is likely to further illuminate various aspects of the identity formation process.
Appendix. Calculation of the Size Localization Measure
In previous studies, a number of measures have been developed to weight the effects of competition and legitimation by size. This study took as a starting point a measure developed by Banaszak-Holl (1991) , who, in her study of the historical development of the Manhattan banking industry, focused on the inverse of distance: nearness. (For a measure focusing on distance, see Hannan et al. 1990 or Carroll and Hannan 2000.) This nearness measure, based on the difference in size S between an organization i and its competitor j, is constructed as follows:
Although Banaszak-Holl's (1991) measure offers several advantages over the distance measure initially proposed by Hannan et al. (1990) , a disadvantage is that very small deviations from the size of organization i are translated into substantially lower Nearness it , while subsequent increases in the difference between S it and S jt decrease Nearness it only to a lesser extent. This effect is theoretically undesirable because in the conceptualization of, for instance, size-localized legitimation, it implies that a very small difference in size between organizations i and j can be equated with substantially lower legitimation between these organizations compared to the case in which i and j are of equal size. It seems unlikely that organizations that differ only marginally in size would have such a low likelihood of recognizing each other, so an alternative measure was developed for this study that takes into account the idea that very small differences in size induce relatively little change in the value of Nearness it . This measure is a Gaussian function of the distance between S it and S jt .
Nearness it = j j =i exp − S it − S jt max S it − S jt 2 Parameter in this analysis was set equal to 2, because this yields a nearness of almost 0 as the difference in size between i and j approaches its maximum, meaning that, in terms of size, organization i is not near to its competitors at all. (Alternative parameterisations ( = 1 5 and = 2 5) were tested and did not change the statistical significance of the results.) Endnotes 1 Prior to 1994, when the Regulations for the Administration of Foreign Investment Financial Institutions were introduced, the length of this probation period was three years (Fu 1998) . 2 The liability of newness may of course extend well after the founding event; see Ruef (2006) for a graphical representation of a pre-and postfounding negative age dependence of failure rates. 3 This theory has also been applied to organizational growth and mortality rates (Carroll and Hannan 2000, pp. 216-222) . 4 Favored were, for instance, four "quasi-foreign" banks-i.e., HSBC, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, Standard Chartered, and the Bank of East Asia. These banks already operated branch offices prior to 1990 and simply had to reapply for a license under the new regulations. The shift of these banks to branch status is therefore not included in this analysis, as this study only focuses on those banks that make the shift from representative office to branch office. These banks are, however, included in the density counts, and as such they do affect the entry of other banks. 5 The substantial proportion of endings, of which 16 banks dropped out of the market altogether, moderates possible concerns over a selection bias in that only those banks that will transition anyway might establish an office in the first place. 6 These districts are the four central districts of Luwan, Nanshi, Huangpu, and Jingan; the urban districts of Hongkow, Yangpu, Xuhui, and Changning; and the suburban district Pudong. 7 A second-order effect of a squared term was investigated, but it did not appear to be statistically significant, so this term was therefore omitted. 8 Banks that were able to upgrade to branch status after one year may have fulfilled part of the mandatory waiting time requirement by means of a representative office elsewhere in China. Assumed here is that these banks started preparing for the status upgrade and enter the risk set only after they came to be located in Shanghai with a representative office. This assumption is based on our interpretation of the initiation of this event as a signal of the intent to set up a branch at a later stage. 9 By removing too-small banks and the observations prior to 1990, we run the risk of being exposed to selection bias. In analyses not reported here, we did not omit these bank-year observations, but added control variables instead. The results, which are available on request from the authors, show nearly identical results to those reported here.
